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ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The data used 
is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. It contains information on 42 680 male 
workers, of which 8 759 are employed in public and 33 921 in the private sector. The study 
documents and describes data by education, occupation and industry. We estimate earnings 
equations for the whole sample as well as for four industries (construction, real estate, 
transportation and health) that provide an adequate mix of both public and sector workers. The 
results suggest that the private-public sector pay gap of about one per cent can be accounted for by 
differences in observable characteristics between the sectors (3.4 per cent) and lower returns from 
these characteristics (-2.3 per cent). However, the industry-level analysis indicates that the earnings 
gaps vary across industries, and are negative in some cases. These inter-industry differences in 
public-private gaps persist even when the usual controls are introduced. This suggests that public 
sector wage setters need greater local flexibility, which should result in less uniform wages within 
the public sector. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Public sector pay is a matter of natural concern for economists and policy makers. It is commonly 
stated that public sector pay settlements need to be kept at a modest level for reasons of 
macroeconomic stability. It may thus be argued that if public sector pay is too high, then this puts 
upward pressure on the public sector wage bill – which is a significant part of public expenditure. 
Upward pressure on public spending may well increase government borrowing requirements and 
also potentially set the macro-economy on a wage-price inflationary path. If the private sector looks 
to the public sector before setting its wages, then high public sector wage awards can lead to 
expectations of high inflation and hence high private sector awards. It is this wage-price-wage 
expectation driven spiral that public sector wage setters are keen to avoid. On the other hand, public 
sector employers do not operate in a vacuum. If public sector pay is set at too low a level, then the 
public sector which competes for labour with the private sector will be at a serious disadvantage in 
terms of the recruitment and retention of good quality labour. This latter effect may have become 
more important in recent years. In their study based on UK data, Nickell and Quintini (2005) found 
that for male employees declining relative pay in the public sector did in fact result in measurable 
loss of quality. The same phenomenon did not appear important for female workers. 
 
The nature of public sector employment has changed radically since the 1980s. Most European 
countries have seen significant privatisations of former state monopolies in the last two decades. 
This has meant a shift in the type of workers employed in the public sector from blue collar skilled 
manufacturing-based to white collar service-based. At the same time, governments have come 
under increasing public pressure to be more accountable to the public for the standard of public 
services whether in teaching, healthcare, or social provision. This increased pressure to perform 
means that the quality of the public sector workforce is of increasing importance. If public sector 
pay falls significantly below that of the private sector, then in a competitive labour market, high 
quality workers will desert the public sector for private sector employment and hence undermine the 
government’s commitment to high quality provision in the public sector services. This situation is a 
bigger potential threat in times of relatively low unemployment. 
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The explicit competition between the public and private sector for good quality workers implies that 
any study of public sector wage determination cannot be carried out in isolation. At least for 
contextual reasons, it is necessary for the process of public sector wage determination to be carried 
out simultaneously with that of private sector wage determination. Indeed, this allows us to focus 
directly on the public-private wage gap. 
 
In this study we analyse the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The 
Finnish economy provides a good case study as in many ways it is representative of modern 
advanced countries – high GDP per capita, a strong welfare state, high employment, a secular 
decline in manufacturing and corresponding rise in the service sector, a strong tradition of public 
sector employment and a well educated labour force. Collective wage bargaining procedures, in 
which the government has played a prominent role since 1968, together with high coverage of wage 
agreements and tight wage-wage links between different sectors of the economy, lend special 
interest to our country analysis. Recent developments, showing a tendency towards local level wage 
bargaining and performance-related pay, in particular, call for an empirical analysis that examines 
differences in how individual characteristics are rewarded in the private and in the public sector and 
how work-place characteristics and local environment affect pay. Our empirical analysis utilises an 
employee-based survey (Finnish Labour Force Survey) with rich details of workers’ characteristics 
and accurate information on the employer’s sector, whether public or private. One advantage of the 
data is that it allows us to examine pay gaps by certain industries, providing more detailed 
information on industry-level pay differentials across employers’ status.1 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the wage bargaining institutions in 
the Finnish labour market. We describe the pay determination system and show the evolution of pay 
across the public and private sectors over recent decades. Section 3 outlines the data and the 
econometric framework. We examine pay gaps using individual-level data, thus controlling for 
differences in employee characteristics across the public and private sector. We also perform 
disaggregated analysis for certain industries. Section 4 reports the results of the empirical analysis, 
and section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 Our analysis thus contributes to recent country studies on public sector pay, conducted for the UK, Canada, France, 
Spain and Italy, among others; see Disney and Gosling, 1998, Lassibille, 1998, Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary, 1999; 
Mueller 1998; Chatterji and Mumford, 2007; Lucifora and Meurs, 2007 and Disney 2007. 
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2 Wage bargaining institutions in Finland 
 
 
The Finnish labour market is heavily unionized, having one of the highest rates of union 
membership in the industrialised world with approximately 75 per cent of employees organised in 
trade unions.2 With around 70 trade unions organised into three labour confederations, there is a 
union for every employee in Finland regardless of line of work, type of employment or status in the 
enterprise. 
 
There are three main central labour confederations on the employees’ side.3 The largest of those is 
the Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions, SAK. It is a confederation of 21 trade unions with more 
than one million members. About half of the members of SAK-affiliated unions work in industry, 
about one-third in private services and one quarter in the public sector. The members of these 
unions work in a wide range of occupations, including childminders, flight attendants, bus drivers, 
waiters, builders and paper mill employees. When one recognises that the size of the Finnish labour 
force is only 2.7 million, the significant of SAK becomes clear.  
 
The Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees, STTK, consists of 19 affiliated trade unions that 
represent approximately 640 000 professional employees. The member unions organize employees 
in industry, private services, local government and central government. The members of STTK-
affiliated unions are employed in various occupations, including nurses, technical engineers, police 
officers, secretaries and salesmen. AKAVA, the Confederation of Unions for Professional and 
Managerial Staff, is a trade union confederation for those with university, professional or other 
high-level education, formed by 31 affiliates and with about 460 000 members. In the public sector 
AKAVA's bargaining mandate is held by Public Sector Negotiating Commission, JUKO. In the 
private sector, the negotiating body is the Delegation of Professional and Managerial Employees 
(YTN), although certain affiliates negotiate independently. 
 
The four employer confederations are: the Confederation of Finnish Industries, the Office for the 
Government as Employer, the Commission for Local Authority Employers and the Church of 
Finland Negotiating Commission. Membership in employers´ associations is also high. About 60 
per cent of all firms, representing about 70 per cent of the total work force belong to employers’ 
associations.  
                                                 
2 See OECD, 2007, for a recent country comparison. 
3 See Työmarkkina-avain, 2007. 
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 In the public sector all agreements for government employees are made between the Office for the 
Government as Employer operating, under the Ministry of Finance, and the bargaining agents. This 
system covers about six per cent of the labour force, totalling about 130 000 employees. The 
Commission for Local Authority Employers, in turn, negotiates with the bargaining agents 
representing the personnel of local and joint authorities. This covers about 430 000 employees. 
Local government employers, comprising more than 400 municipalities and 200 joint municipal 
authorities, include hospitals, health centres, comprehensive schools, upper secondary schools, 
vocational institutions, polytechnics, day care centres, libraries, museums, homes for the elderly, 
youth affairs centres, and local traffic and fire and rescue departments.  
 
Industrial relations are regulated by collective agreements which, in turn, regulate the minimum 
conditions for job in question and establish labour peace. Collective wage bargaining, in which the 
government plays a prominent role, has been used in the Finnish labour market since 1968. These 
agreements provide the framework for branch-specific collective agreements; see Figure 1. In all 
cases the employers´ associations and trade unions sign collective agreements of their own. Because 
collective labour contracts are binding for non-union members in industries where more than half of 
the employees are union members, around 90 per cent of all employees are covered by collective 
agreements.4 
                                                 
4 Työmarkkina-avain, 2007. 
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Figure 1: Public and private sector pay determination in Finland; two main alternative procedures 
 
Procedure 1                   Procedure 2    
No framework agreement by central 
organizations 
• No willingness or 
• No prerequisites  for an agreement 
Framework agreement by central 
organizations 
• Frame wage settlement 
• Other labor market issues (working time, 
social policy, training) 
• Possible government involvement 
(legislative measures, taxation) 
• Variation in coverage
Sectoral agreements 
• Branch-specific and binding agreements on all conditions 
of  employment 
• Possibility to agree about certain issues on local 
level=deviation through local bargaining 
• Commitment to labour peace 
 
Figure 2 shows that wages have increased, although with modest discrepancies, at the same pace in 
both the private and public sector, the latter consisting of the pay of local and central government 
employees, over the past three decades. This development is in line with the view that wage-wage 
links across different sectors and segments of the labor market tend to be tight in a unionized 
economy.5 The average wage rates do, however, differ across the sectors. In the private sector, the 
average gross wage was 2 597 euros in 2006. In the public sector, the average monthly wage was 2 
460 euros, the gross wage gap thus being about 5.5 per cent in favor of the private sector.  
 
Although wage increases over the years have been of a similar magnitude in all these three sectors, 
as Figure 2 shows, minor growth differentials can produce changes in wage premiums across the 
sectors. This is displayed in Figure 3, which depicts wage gaps, measured as deviations from private 
sector pay, over the last 25-year period. The aggregate private-public sector wage gap conceals the 
fact that within the public sector there is a significant differential between the central and local 
government employees. This is clearly visible in the Figure, which also shows some narrowing of 
the gap with the relative position of the private sector showing steady improvement since 1980. The 
positive wage premium of central government employees declined from about twelve per cent in 
                                                 
5 See Honkapohja et al (1999) for Finnish and Holmlund (1992) for Swedish evidence. 
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1980 to about four per cent in 2005. The negative gap of local government employees rose, in turn, 
from about four per cent to eight per cent over the same period. 
 
This difference in gross earnings is noteworthy since skill requirements, measured by level of 
education, are on average much higher in the public sector than in the private sector. In 2004, for 
example, 34 per cent of all central government employees had at least a Master’s level university 
degree. In local government jobs this figure was 16 per cent, and in the private sector only about 10 
per cent.6 
 
 
Although centralized agreements have also been the main mode of wage bargaining during the 
present decade, there has been a growing tendency towards local level wage bargaining. This 
reflects, to some extent, the desire of private sector employers to allow more decision-making on 
pay rises on the company level. This has been motivated by the need to boost and ensure the firm’s 
competitiveness in global markets.  
 
In the public sector the shift towards local (authority) level bargaining stems from the introduction 
of new pay schemes that are based on job evaluation and performance appraisal schemes. The broad 
objective of such pay schemes has been to improve the competitive edge of the public sector in the 
labour market. In 2004, performance-related pay systems accounted for about 15-20 per cent of the 
sector’s employees. In the central government, such pay systems were applied by about 50 agencies 
and departments, covering about 40 per cent of employees. Since the beginning of 2008 the new 
pay system has been applied across the entire public sector where employee remuneration consists 
of a job-specific and a personal pay component. The personal pay component can account for up to 
48 per cent of the job-specific pay.7 The old pay system, based on tenured positions and seniority, is 
thus gradually changing.8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The Finnish public sector as employer, 2007. 
7 The Office for the Government as Employer, 2007. 
8 The latest proposal concerns the employee-status of university workers, the biggest group of workers in the central 
government sector. If the new legislative proposal is passed, all employees working in academia will no longer be civil 
servants but contract-based workers from 2010 onwards. Secure life-time contracts cannot be replaced by unsecured 
contracts without pay-related compensations. The debate on this issue will commence soon. 
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Figure 2: Annual wage increases, employees in local government, central government and the 
private sector, 1965-2005  
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Figure 3:  Pay premiums, central and local government, 1980-2005 
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3 The Data and Econometric Model 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The data used is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. The data contain 
information on 42 680 male workers, 8 759 in the public and 33 921 in the private sector. The wage 
variable is annual earnings. However, we have no information on hours worked. Accordingly we 
exclude all workers whose annual earnings are below 12 000 euros per annum on the grounds that 
these are likely to be part-time workers. At the upper end of the earnings distribution, the data is 
truncated as reported annual earnings are capped at 72 000 euros. Information is available on a 
range of worker characteristics – age, education, experience, marital status and occupation. A full 
list of these variables is given in Appendix 1. Crucially, the data also contain information on the 
industry worked in and whether the employer is in the private or public sector.  
 
Tables A1- 4 present descriptive statistics drawn from the data. Table A1 reports average monthly 
wages by the status of the employer (private or public) and the employees’ industry. In Table A2, 
the classification is by education, in Table A3 by occupation and in Table A4 by the employees’ 
field of education. 
 
The monthly wages are, on average, higher in the private than public sector. The private sector 
premium over the public sector is highest in electricity (557), electricity being also the highest-paid 
industry amongst private sector workers. The premium is also high in real estate (421), 
manufacturing (409) and construction (279). Public sector workers earn a premium in three 
industries namely, transportation (383), health (147) and education (38). In the public sector 
transportation is the highest-paid industry with the average monthly wage of 2,815 euros.  
 
Private sector workers earn more at all educational levels, the wage gap varying from 216 euros 
(secondary education) to 409 euros (lowest level university education); see Table A2. The numbers 
shows that the approximate equality of public and private sector wages at the aggregate level is 
mainly due to the high proportion of public sector workers with a high level of education (approx. 
23 per cent of all public sector employees) compared to the high proportion of workers with only 
secondary-level education in the private sector (approx. 49 per cent of the total). For the first group 
the average monthly wage is 3,502 whereas in the second group it is only 2,383 euros.  
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Table A3 reports wages by occupation. Private sector workers enjoy a premium in all occupations, 
excluding services where the wage gap in favor of public sector workers is 191 euros. The average 
monthly earnings of private sector workers are highest in managerial occupations (3,798), where the 
wage premium is also the highest (617). The wage gap is also high in technical and clerical 
occupations (434 and 421). The lowest average wages in the public sector are in craft (2,110) and 
clerical (1,927) occupations. Sales and care, in turn, are the low paid occupations (2,077) in the 
private sector. 
 
Finally, Table A4 reports wages by field of education. This variable is measured by the highest 
level of education an individual has attained. According to our data private sector workers have the 
biggest premiums over the public sector in the natural and technical sciences and in agriculture. 
Public sector workers, in turn, exhibit a substantial premium in services. The wage gap is lowest if 
the field of education is trade. 
 
As figure 3 showed the unconditional wage gap between the public sector and private sector has 
varied between 12 and -8 per cent over the years, depending on the sector of employment (local 
authority versus central government). In our sample the unconditional wage gap for males working 
full-time is 1.4 per cent. To illustrate the importance of individual characteristics on pay, we 
estimated a simple wage equation that includes a dummy variable for the public sector and controls 
for two basic variables affecting individual pay: experience (age) and education.9 The results 
indicate that public sector wage gap is about 5.5 per cent when controlled for age and education. In 
other words, workers with same education and age earn considerably less in the public sector than 
in the private sector. The gap is smallest for the workers in the lowest 25th percentile (-2.4 per cent) 
and highest in the 75th percentile (8.1 per cent) of the wage distribution. This calls for a detailed 
analysis of how characteristics are rewarded across the public and private sectors. This is the main 
aim of the next section. 
                                                 
9  The model is ln (W) = α + β*dummy + β1*age + β2*age2 + β2 *(Education) + error. Educational levels are described 
in the data appendix. 
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3.2 Econometric model  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to study private-public wage differentials. According to previous 
Finnish studies, there seems to be differences between wages as well as in pay determination 
processes. Therefore it is appropriate to allow the coefficients of all the explanatory characteristics 
to vary across the two labor markets. Separate wage equations are therefore estimated by OLS for 
cross-section samples of public and private sector (group j) workers (individuals i) and are 
expressed as 
 
jijijijiji XW ,,,,,ln εβα ++=     (1)                                                 
 
where is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings, jiW ,ln ji,α is the constant term,  
determines the matrix of the values of the explanatory variables, 
jiX ,
ji,β stands for a vector of 
unknown parameters and ji ,ε stands for the error terms. An assumption for this model is that 
E( publicε ) = E( privateε ) = 0. This indicates that employees between the private and public sector are 
normally distributed. This is, however, questionable.10  
 
To scrutinize wage premiums more closely we apply the widely used Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) methodology where the difference in observed mean log earnings between the public sector 
(pu) and the private sector (pr) is decomposed as follows: 
 
)ˆˆ(ˆ)()ˆˆ(lnln puprpuprpuprpuprpupr XXXWW βββαα −+−+−=−    (2) 
 
The average differential in log wages between the two sectors is thus decomposable into two 
components. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (2) captures the explained part (or 
endowments) of the total wage differential, which is due to differences in the individual’s 
characteristics weighted by the parameters from the model for the private sector pr. The third 
measures the unexplained gap (or treatment), which is due to differences in the parameters weighted 
by the means of the public sector (pu) regressors. The first term on the right-hand side of the 
                                                 
10 In this paper we do not control for selection bias for two reasons. First, the selection process is extremely difficult to 
model, and, second, the qualitative and quantitatively results of this study accord with those reported in Mazculjskij 
2008. 
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equation captures the difference between the estimated constant terms and is added to the 
unexplained part of the total pay gap.  
 
 
4 Empirical results 
 
4.1 Results from the aggregate equations 
 
Table 1 reports the OLS-estimates of our earnings function. Column 1 shows the results of the 
baseline specification where only individual characteristics are controlled for. The specification 
incorporates one seldom-used variable, namely field of education, into the model. Column 2 reports 
the results from a specification that augments the baseline model by industry and regional 
variables.11  
 
The empirical performance of both specifications is adequate, the explanatory power of the model 
varying from 0.38 (baseline, private sector) to 0.55 (augmented, public sector). Overall, the 
individual parameter estimates are well-defined, have the expected sign and are robust across 
specifications. For example, the returns from experience and qualifications fall in line with previous 
findings, including those of Korkeamäki (1999, 2000).12 
 
The results indicate that the returns from experience and tenure are positive in both sectors. The 
returns from experience are slightly higher in the public sector at approximately 1.8 per cent per 
annum versus 1.2 per cent in the private sector. This result deviates from previous findings 
                                                 
11 The data at hand contain no firm-specific information. The role of work-place characteristics and local environment 
on pay are captured by the industry affiliation of an employee and regional characteristics of the area where the 
employee lives. These industry and regional effects are specified as a dummy variable (fixed effects). We assume that 
the industry variable captures differentials in pay that arise from differences in technology or market conditions across 
industries. Regional variables, in turn, capture rents from agglomeration, whereas R&D variables reflect differences in 
the average quality/productivity of firms across regions.  Where cost of living factors influence pay, regional variables 
may to some extent capture those as well. 
 
12 Korkeamäki (1999) examines public and private-sector pay using microeconomic panel data over the years 1987-94. 
He finds that the private sector premium over public sector pay for males has been around 3-5 per cent over the period. 
In a follow-up study (2000) he analyses wage development in the central government compared to that in the general 
labour market (private sector and local government). The findings, based on a panel from the period 1989-97, imply that 
on average central government pay has been higher. On the other hand, the controlled wage gap decreased from about 
10 per cent to about 5 per cent over the investigation period, the unexplained part of the wage gap increasing from zero 
to -8 per cent.  
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elsewhere.13 The returns from tenure are, in turn, slightly higher in the private sector than in the 
public sector (0.7-0.8 versus 0.4-0.6 per cent per annum). 
  
The previous wage literature indicates that married men enjoy higher wages than unmarried men. In 
both sectors the premium is about 5-6 per cent. Having a child or children is not associated with 
significantly higher earnings. The returns from being a non-Finnish speaker vary somewhat across 
the specifications. In the baseline model the estimates are not statistically significant. In the 
augmented model non-native employees in the public sector capture a positive premium, whereas 
both non-native speakers and Swedish speakers obtain modest negative premiums in the private 
sector.14  
 
The returns to education are measured relative to the omitted education category, which in our case 
is primary education. Since this group is lower paid in the public sector (2,110 a month compared to 
2,335 in the private sector), we might expect to see larger rates of return for higher education levels 
in this sector. This is, in fact, the case. For example, the return to higher university level education 
is about 52-54 per cent in the public sector compared to about 37-43 per cent in the private sector; 
see columns 1 and 2. In absolute terms, this implies an increase in monthly pay of about 1,050 in 
the public and 920 in the private sector.15 
 
The field of education of an individual has a direct impact on wages in both sectors, after 
controlling for a number of individual characteristics as well as industry and regional 
characteristics. In the public sector the premium over the reference group (business and social 
sciences) is highest amongst individuals with education in medicine or services (approx. 15-19 %). 
In the private sector, the fields of education with a premium are the natural sciences (approx. 9 %) 
and general education (approx. 5-7 %). Individuals with education in the humanities and arts, in 
turn, suffer from a considerable negative premium in both sectors (approx. -7 %).  
 
The returns from being in upper end (managerial, professional and technical) rather than operative 
occupations are all higher in the private sector. Premiums in these occupations are about 32, 20 and 
                                                 
13 Studies in Greece (Kanellopoulos, 1997), Canada (Prescott & Wandschneider, 1999), Peru (Stelcner & Gaag & 
Vijverberg, 1989, Great Britain (Chatterji 6 Mumford, 2007, Bender & Elliott, 2002), Poland (Adamchik & Bedi 2000), 
Spain (Lassibille, 1998) and Turkey (Tansel, 1999) imply a premium from experience in the private over public sector. 
14 Prescott and Wandschneider (1999) found that in Canada non-native speakers and French speakers suffer from a 
negative pay premium of about 5 and 3 per cent in both sectors. 
15 Korkeamäki (1999), Asplund (1993) and Maczulskij (2007) report a slight private sector premium in returns to 
education for males. Quantile regression estimates by Budria (2006), in turn, imply that return to education is highest in 
the lower and highest parts of the distribution in the public sector 
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12 per cent in the private sector and 20, 16 and 9 per cent in the public sector, respectively. These 
differences are notable since also the average monthly pay in operative occupations is over 150 
euros higher in the private sector (2,220 versus 2,375). The returns from being in lower end 
occupations (clerks, crafts and sales & care) are similarly noteworthy. For sales & care the relative 
returns are clearly better for public sector employees, the premium being plus 7 per cent in the 
public sector (augmented equation) and minus 7 per cent in the private sector (augmented equation). 
In turn, the relative returns are slightly better for clerks in the private sector than in the public sector 
(-4 versus -9 %). These findings fall in line with the previous Finnish results.16  
 
There are three issues related to the role of the industry affiliation and regional location of the 
employer that must be noted. First, the inclusion of industry and regional dummy variables 
considerably improves the statistical performance of the earning equation, the explanatory power of 
the augmented model increasing in both cases by about 5 percentage points. Second, the F-tests 
indicate that the relative role of the industry and regional variables differ across the two sectors. 
According to the test results we can drop the sub-region variables from the earnings equation for the 
public sector but not from that for the private sector. Similarly, the RD-indicator and province 
variable are highly significant in the private sector equation but only barely significant at 5 per cent 
level in the public sector equation (10.8 versus 2.4 and 17.6 versus 4.4; see the lower part of the 
Table).17  
 
Third, industry affiliation has a clear role in pay but, once again, it bears less importance in the 
public sector, the F-test value being 98.3 for the private sector and 51.7 for the public sector. The 
returns relative to trade, which is the reference industry, are, however, similar in both sectors, with 
two exceptions. In transportation and finance the premiums in the public exceed those of the private 
sector considerably, being 24 per cent versus 8 per cent in the former and 38 per cent versus 21 per 
cent in the latter.  
 
                                                 
16 The analysis by Korkeamäki (1999) of white-collar and blue-collar workers indicates a private sector premium of 
around 14-22 per cent for white-collar workers, depending on econometric specification and time period. For blue-
collar workers the private sector premium is considerably less, varying between 0.5 and 5 per cent. The separate 
analysis for occupational level by Brunila (1990) reveals a conditional pay gap by occupational level of 7-9 per cent in 
favour of private sector. For similar international results, see Kanellopoulos (1997) and Garcia-Pèrez & Jimeno (2005).  
17 The province effect in the public sector earnings equation is driven by a public pay system that compensates for rural 
conditions in the Northern provinces. It is worth noting that the unemployment variable does not provide evidence of 
the role of market forces in pay determination in the private sector, higher unemployment being associated with higher 
pay. This effect is, however, modest and dropping the variable from the equation does not affect the other estimates. 
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Finally, inclusion of the control variables does not change our interpretation on the parameter 
estimates reported in the baseline equation. In the publics sector equation there is a small reduction 
in the returns from tenure and (from 0.6 to 0.4 % per annum) and a rise in the returns from being a 
non-native speaker (from 3 to 6 %). In the private sector, being a non-native speaker now 
significantly lowers pay (3 %). These latter results suggest that there is some segregation of high 
paid non-native workers into high paying public sector jobs and the opposite in the private sector. 
As a whole the results suggest that the introduction of industry and regional characteristics does not 
have an impact on the relationship between the individual characteristics of the workers and their 
wages in the public or private sectors as a whole.   
 
Taken together, these results suggest that there is greater flexibility in private sector wage setting. In 
particular, the significance of the effects of local factors on private sector pay is particularly 
important. If centrally determined pay awards are approximately of the same order in both the 
public and private sectors (see Figure 2), then it is precisely these local deviations from centrally 
negotiated norms that are driving a wedge between public and private sector pay. If deterioration in 
worker quality is not to blight public sector performance, then the public sector has to respond with 
greater local flexibility too. There are clear signs that this process is belatedly beginning. The new 
pay systems introduced in the public sector, where compensations consist of a job-specific and a 
personal pay component are clearly a step toward greater local flexibility.  The private sector may 
still rely more heavily than the public sector on performance-related pay and rewards for greater 
productivity. However, the measurement of productivity is difficult in the public sector. Whilst this 
may limit the scope of performance pay in the public sector, it does highlight the need for more 
flexibility on the part of public wage setters in seeking to match private sector wage rises.  
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Table 1: OLS-regressions for males, the dependent variable is log annual earnings 
Specification Baseline Augmented 
  Public  Private Public Private 
Explanatory variables     
  
Experience   0,018***   0,012***   0,018***   0,012*** 
Experience squared.  -0,028***  -0,022***  -0,027***  -0,022*** 
Tenure   0,006***   0,008***   0,004***   0,007*** 
Married   0,060***   0,055***   0,060***   0,055*** 
Child   0,002   0,001   0,002   0,009*** 
Language     
  Swedish   0,004  -0,007   0,006   -0,019*** 
  Non-native   0,035   0,011   0,059***   -0,031** 
Education     
  Secondary   0,105***   0,116***   0,094***   0,095*** 
  Lowest level   0,219***   0,204***   0,208***   0,176*** 
  Lower-degree level   0,391***   0,289***   0,360***   0,253*** 
  Higher-degree or doctorate   0,540***   0,434***   0,524***   0,376*** 
Field of education     
  General   0,131***   0,076***   0,128***   0,053*** 
  Teaching  -0,099***  -0,110***  -0,035*  -0,051 
  Humanities & art  -0,087***  -0,076***  -0,044**  -0,073*** 
  Natural sciences  -0,096***   0,089***  -0,064**'   0,088*** 
  Technology   0,058***   0,020**'   0,065***   0,018*** 
  Agriculture   0,013  -0,079***   0,032**  -0,037*** 
  Medical   0,148***   0,000   0,196***   0,024 
  Services   0,172***  -0,010   0,157***  -0,009 
  Higheduother   0,077***    0,129***  
Occupation     
  Managerial   0,142***   0,320***   0,195*'*   0,323*** 
  Professional   0,085***   0,206***   0,160***   0,209*** 
  Technical   0,034***   0,117***   0,087***   0,121*** 
  Clerk  -0,142***  -0,043***  -0,091***  -0,044*** 
  Sales & care   0,019  -0,116***   0,075***  -0,068*** 
  Craft  -0,038***  -0,035***  -0,008  -0,036*** 
  Other  -0,127***  -0,090***  -0,057***  -0,079*** 
Industry     
  Manufacturing     0,081   0,126*** 
  Electricity     0,223***   0,261*** 
  Construction     0,112***   0,113*** 
  Sales & Hotel & restaurant     0,045   0,029 
  Transportation     0,241***   0,083*** 
  Finance     0,377***   0,217*** 
  Real estate & research     0,042***   0,048* 
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  Public administration     0,109*** (dropped) 
  Health     0,030***   0,028 
  Other     0,064***   0,036 
R&D in the area     
  R&D2     0,035**   0,027** 
  R&D3     0,029   0,040*** 
  R&D4     0,046**   0,054*** 
  R&D5     0,068***   0,061*** 
  R&D6     0,029   0,056*** 
  R&D7     0,032   0,075*** 
  R&D8     0,051**   0,096*** 
Province     
  West     0,007  -0,016*** 
  East    -0,007  -0,058*** 
  North     0,025**  -0,019*** 
Sub-region     
  University    -0,02  -0,072*** 
  Regional centre    -0,015  -0,094**' 
  Industrial centre    -0,009  -0,026*** 
  Rural area    -0,013  -0,128*** 
  Countryside     0,004  -0,173*** 
Unemployment    -0,001   0,005*** 
Constant 9,666***   9,857***   9,510***   9,735*** 
     
Number of observations   8759   33921   8759   33921 
Adjusted R-squared   0,519   0,388   0,552   0,432 
Industry dropped     F(n1 n2)  -  -   51,71***   98,35*** 
R&D dropped          F(n1 n2)  -  -   2,40**   10,85*** 
Province dropped     F(n1 n2)  -  -   4,46**   17,65*** 
Sub-region dropped F(n1 n2)  -  -   0,36   75,61*** 
 
Notes: *** (**, *) denotes statistical significance on at least at the 1 % (5, 10) level. Reference categories are: no 
child/children, Finnish, primary education, business & social sciences, operative, education, south, metropolitan area 
and R&D1. F(n1, n2): n1 = 9 for industry, 6 for R&D, 2 for province and 4 for sub-region; n2 = 8705 and 33 869 for 
public and private sector, respectively 
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4.2 Results from the industry-level equations 
 
We continue the investigation by estimating earnings equations for four industries namely, 
construction, real estate, transportation and health. These industries were chosen solely for data 
considerations, i.e., the number of observations in both the public and private sectors.18 The results 
of these experiments are reported in Tables 2 and 3. For the sake of brevity we do not report all the 
parameter estimates; the importance of unreported controls is given by F-statistics in the lower part 
of the Tables. 
 
The industry level results are consistent with the results for the whole sample, and the earnings 
equations fit the data well. The adjusted R2 varies from 0.32 in the private sector earnings equation 
for construction to 0.72 in the public sector equation for health. In line with the results of the whole 
sample, the returns from experience and tenure are positive and of the same magnitude in all 
industries. Estimates on the returns to education, in turn, show more variation across industries and 
sectors. The results imply that the returns to education are highest in health and lowest in 
construction. The field of education also plays a role in the industry-level equations. The F-tests 
indicate that these controls enter all the equations significantly.  
 
The results on the effect of occupation on earnings follow closely those reported for the whole 
sample. As before, managerial and professional occupations enjoy considerable premiums. 
Managerial premiums are comparable across the sectors in transportation and health (approx. 35 
%), whereas in construction and real estate the private sector premiums exceed those of the public 
sector. Amongst professional employees the returns in the private sector are higher in all industries, 
excluding health. As before, employees in sales and care occupations are relatively better off in the 
public sector. Similarly, field of education contributes to earnings in all industries and sectors, 
excluding the private sector for health; see the F-test results. 
 
The results suggest that employees of in metropolitan area have a small premium over the other 
areas. These premiums are larger in the private sector than in the public sector and, in fact, as the F-
tests indicate, we can drop the sub-region variables from the public sector earnings equations but 
not from the private sector equations, excluding health. Again, this is in line with the results shown 
in Table 1 for the whole sample. 
                                                 
18 The small number of observations in certain cells (non-native, Swedish speaking) shows up in the empirical results; 
see estimates for these variables for construction and real estate in Table 3. 
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Table 2: OLS-regressions for males by industry; construction and real estate 
  Construction Real estate 
ln(year pay) Public Private Public Private 
     
Experience   0,004   0,010***   0,018***   0,015*** 
Experience squared.  -0,008  -0,014***  -0,027***  -0,024*** 
Tenure   0,007***   0,005***   0,002*   0,005*** 
Married   0,037*   0,043***   0,087***   0,072*** 
Child   0,019   0,006  -0,018   0,017* 
Language     
  Swedish   0,009  -0,098***   0,006   0,016 
  Non-native (dropped)  -0,153**   0,224***   0,055 
Education     
  Secondary   0,048  -0,046   0,053   0,103*** 
  Lowest level   0,234***  -0,003   0,171***   0,163*** 
  Lower-degree level   0,291***   0,066   0,283***   0,223*** 
  Higher-degree level   0,298***   0,184***   0,442***   0,343*** 
Occupation     
  Managerial   0,185***   0,315***   0,315***   0,471*** 
  Professional   0,085*   0,266***   0,157***   0,318*** 
  Technical  -0,048*   0,184***   0,066   0,170** 
  Clerk  -0,083   0,027  -0,039   0,115*** 
  Sales & care  -0,011   0,080   0,093  -0,085*** 
  Craft  -0,103***   0,082***   0,026   0,075** 
  Other  -0,195***   0,043  -0,039  -0,057* 
Constant   9,964***   10,084***   9,586***   9,861*** 
Number of observations   505   2351   1316   4009 
Adjusted R-squared   0,486   0,33   0,625   0,448 
Field of education dropped 
F(n1,n2)   3,21***   3,56***   5,71***   4,71*** 
Province dropped F(n1,n2)   1,34   2,69*   0,41   0,13 
Sub-region dropped F(n1, n2)   1,56   7,69***   1,39   5,84*** 
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Table 3: OLS-regressions for males by industry; transportation and health 
 
  Transportation Health 
ln(year pay) Public Private Public Private 
     
Experience   0,019***   0,015***   0,009***   0,011 
Experience squared.  -0,030***  -0,024***  -0,011**  -0,016 
Tenure   0,003**   0,004***   0,003   0,008 
Married   0,024   0,057***   0,038**   0,150* 
Child   0,007   0,01   0,007   0,024 
Language     
  Swedish   0,053   0,004   0,003   0,019 
  Non-native   0,084  -0,005  -0,046  -0,156 
Education     
  Secondary   0,261***   0,087***   0,226***   0,401* 
  Lowest level   0,429***   0,213***   0,331***   0,539** 
  Lower-degree level   0,523***   0,306***   0,421***   0,567** 
  Higher-degree level   0,652***   0,362***   0,879*** 
  
0,869*** 
Occupation     
  Managerial   0,396*   0,367***   0,346***   0,335 
  Professional   0,140**   0,258***   0,278***   0,121 
  Technical   0,253***   0,223***   0,154**  -0,105 
  Clerk  -0,058  -0,044***   0,110  -0,372 
  Sales & care   0,117   0,131***   0,177***   0,065 
  Craft   0,038   0,059***   0,171***  -0,010 
  Other  -0,043  -0,002   0,048  -0,066 
Constant   9,574***   9,783***   9,282*** 
  
9,280*** 
Number of observations   425   3935   1083   129 
Adjusted R-squared   0,502   0,388   0,751   0,467 
Education dropped F(n1,n2)   12,57***   4,53***   9,14***   1,61 
Province dropped F(n1,n2)   0,69   1,73   0,26   1,51 
Sub-region dropped F(n1, n2)   0,98   8,23***   0,73   0,75 
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4.3 Decompositions of wage gaps 
 
In the data the earnings gap is one per cent, full-time private sector employees earning about one 
per cent less on average than full-time public sector employees.  We decompose this gap into the 
component explained by differences in the mean values of the individual characteristics (education, 
occupation etc.) and variables reflecting firm-specific factors (industry, region) and into an 
unexplained component that reflects differences in returns from these factors across the sectors.  
 
Tables 4 and 5 show these decompositions based on the estimated earnings equations. To highlight 
the role of the observable variables, we show results where we have imposed equality between the 
constant terms of the equations.19 When we look at the whole sample, the observable characteristics 
imply a pay gap of around 3.4 per cent in favour of private sector employees. Lower returns from 
the characteristics, in turn, reduce the gap by 2.3 percentage points. These results put the estimated 
gap at 1.1 per cent, which is very close to the actual estimate calculated from the data.  
 
The lower part of the Table provides insights into various components of the gap. Two main 
comments are in order. First, the total premium stemming from the observable characteristics is 
mainly due to four factors namely, education, experience, occupation and industry. Public sector 
employees are better educated (-5.4 %) but less experienced (4.7 %). Furthermore, public sector 
employees work, on average, in better paid occupations (-5.4%) but, on the other hand, they are 
employed in industries that pay less (8.8 %). These results are consistent with those found by 
Korkeamäki (1999) and Maczulskij (2008).  
 
Second, public sector employees receive higher returns from experience and tenure (-7 %) and field 
of education (- 5.5%). The former result accords well with the public sector’s remuneration schemes 
with tenure-based pay rises. The latter result in turn suggests better matching of jobs and field of 
education amongst public sector employees. Private sector workers enjoy higher returns from 
occupation (2.7 %) and from factors that capture workers’ regional environment (6.9 % and 3.2 %). 
Our guess is that the region’s R&D level reflects the average productivity of firms in an area and 
that private sector workers capture a part of the resulting rent as higher earnings. Overall, compared 
                                                 
19 The data rejects this restriction at the 5 per cent but not at the 15 per cent level of significance. In short, the Oaxaca 
composition based on the unrestricted model gives less weight to the industry and regional variables. This suggests that 
the unobserved variables that are captured in the constant terms are correlated with factors describing type of region and 
industry. The results of the unrestricted model are available on request from the authors. 
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to some international findings, the role of individual, industry and regional attributes in explaining 
public-private pay differentials is important in Finland.20   
 
Decompositions based on the earnings equations for the four industries confirm the importance of 
industry in pay determination and the wage gap. In particular, the results suggest that the macro 
analysis conceals and tones down industry-level differences: there appear to be considerable 
differences in the earnings gap between the public and private sectors across industries. In two out 
of the four industries that were examined the earnings gap is negative, i.e. public sector employees 
earn less than their counterparts in the private sector, and in two industries the gap is positive.  
 
In real estate the gap is about -14 and in construction -11 per cent. In real estate the negative 
premium is evenly due to inferior characteristics (-7 %) and lower returns from the characteristics 
of the public sector employees (-7 %) In construction, the negative premium is mainly due to 
differences in characteristics (-7.3 %) and less due to differences in returns (-3.4 %). In 
transportation the public sector enjoys a premium of about 15 per cent. This is mainly due to 
differences in individual characteristics (+11 %). The component associated with returns from the 
characteristics contributes to about 4 per cent of the premium. In health, the public sector premium 
(5.2 per cent) is almost solely due to higher returns from characteristics (4.8 %).  
 
Table 4: Decomposing wage differentials, whole sample, % 
 
  
Earnings gap 
(private-
public) 
Differences in 
characteristics 
Differences 
in returns 
    
Earnings gap 1.1 3.4 - 2.3 
 of which    
 - experience and tenure  4.7 -7.0 
 - education  -5.4 -1.4 
 - field of education  0.6 -5.5 
 - occupation  -5.4 2.7 
 - industry  8.8 -0.5 
 - R&D  -0.1 6.9 
 - region  0.4 3.2 
 
                                                 
20 See, for example, findings from Greece (Kanellopoulos, 1997, Papapetrou, 2006), Cyprus (Christofides & Pashardes, 
2002), France and Italy (Lucifore et al, 2006), UK (Chatterji et al, 2007, Lucifora et al, 2006) and Scotland 
(Heitmueller, 2004). These findings imply a public sector pay premium which is mostly attributed to the fact that public 
sector workers have greater skill characteristics.   
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Table 5: Decomposing wage differentials, selected industries, % 
 
  
Earnings gap 
(private-
public) 
Differences in 
characteristics 
Differences 
in returns 
    
Construction 10.6 7.3 3.3 
    
Real Estate 14.0 7.0 7.0 
    
Transportion -15.0 -11.0 -4.0 
    
Health -5.2 -0.4 -4.8 
    
 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This study analyses the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The data used 
is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. It contains information on 42 680 male 
workers, of which 8 759 are employed in public and 33 921 in the private sector. We estimate 
earnings equations for the whole sample as well as for four industries. The results suggest that the 
private-public sector pay gap of about one per cent can be accounted for by differences in 
observable characteristics between the sectors and lower returns from these characteristics. The 
industry-level analysis indicates that the earnings gaps vary across industries, and are negative in 
some cases. These inter-industry differences in public-private gaps persist even when the usual 
controls are introduced.  
 
The study shows that private-public wage differential has grown in recent years and workers with 
same education and age earn considerably less in the public sector than in the private sector. 
Considerable variation emerges when one looks at data disaggregated by industry, by local vs. 
central government employees or by wage distribution. For example, the wage gap is smallest for 
the workers in the lowest 25th percentile and highest in the 75th percentile of the wage distribution.  
A similar variety is found when one examines the results of the decomposition of wage 
differentials.  
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 Our analysis has important implications for public sector wage setting. All the evidence suggests 
that the private sector, but not the public sector, is taking advantage of the possibility for local 
flexibility. This implies that uniform across-the-board centrally determined pay increases in the 
public sector, although in some sense equitable, are not addressing the real issues. Unless the 
momentum to encourage greater pay in public sector wage setting is maintained, the greater 
flexibility of the private sector in offering effective remuneration based on the need to recruit and 
retain good quality labour will have deleterious effects on the public sector in terms of its 
performance.  
 
Our industry-based results also suggest that the public sector may well need to discriminate between 
employees in different industrial sectors, because private sector competition varies across 
industries. Performance pay may not be easy to implement in the public sector because of 
difficulties in measuring public sector output. Nonetheless, greater flexibility, which would include 
the need to closely examine private sector rewards for similar workers, is required of public sector 
wage setters. To the extent that wage rises in one public sector industry are higher than in another, 
the greater flexibility resulting in greater wage differentials within the public sector need not 
necessarily threaten the overall public sector budget. 
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Data Appendices 
 
 
A0: Variable descriptions 
 
 
Variable Description 
  
Wage  Monthly wage/euros (annual earnings/12) 
Personal characteristics  
Experience Potential work experience 
Exper sqd. Potential work experience^2/100 
Tenure Work experience in current workplace, years  
Married 1 if married or cohabiting 
Child 1 if presence of child or children 
Language Native language 
  Finnish 1 if native language Finnish 
  Swedish 1 if native language Swedish 
  Non-native 1 if native language other than Finnish or Swedish 
Education Level of education 
  Primary 1 if primary education 
  Secondary 1 if secondary education 
  Lowest-level 1 if lowest level tertiary education 
  Lower-degree level 1 if lower-degree level tertiary education 
  Higher-degree or 
doctorate  1 if higher-degree level tertiary or doctorate or equivalent level tertiary 
Field of education 
  General  1 if general, not known or unspecified 
  Teaching 1 if educational science or teacher education 
  Humanities or art 1 if humanities or art 
  Trade 1 if business or social sciences 
  Natural sciences 1 if natural sciences 
  Technology 1 if technology 
  Agriculture 1 if agriculture and forestry 
  Medical 1 if health or welfare 
  Services 1 if services 
Higeduother 1 if interaction between higher-degree level and general 
Occupation Level of occupation 
  Managerial 1 if legislators, senior officials and managers 
  Professional 1 if professionals 
  Technical 1 if technicals and associate professionals 
  Clerks 1 if clerks 
  Sales & care 1 if service and care workers, and shop and market sales workers 
  Craft 1 if craft and related trades workers 
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  Operative 1 if plant and machine operators and assemblers 
  Others 1 if elementary, armed force and agriculture and fishery workers 
Business environment  
Industry Industrial classification 
  Manufacturing 1 if manufacturing, mining and quarrying 
  Electricity 1 if electricity, gas and water supply 
  Construction 1 if construction 
  Sales & hotel & restaurant 1 if wholesale and retail trade, maintenance, repairs, hotel or restaurant  
  Transportation 1 if transport, storage and communication  
  Finance 1 if financial intermediation 
  Real estate & research 1 if real estate, renting and business activities 
  Public administration 1 if public administration and defense 
  Education 1 if education 
  Health 1 if health and social work  
  Other 1 if agriculture, others or not known 
R&D R&D investment in the sub-region, million Euros 
  R&D1 1 if R&D investments is 0,10-0,90 
  R&D2 1 if R&D investment is 1-4.90 
  R&D3 1 if R&D investment is 5-9.90 
  R&D4 1 if R&D investment is 10-49.90 
  R&D5 1 if R&D investment is 50-99.90 
  R&D6 1 if R&D investment is 100-499.90 
  R&D7 1 if R&D investment is 500-999.90 
  R&D8 1 if R&D investment is 1000 or more 
Regional characteristics  
Province Major regions 
  South 1 if major region is Southern Finland 
  West 1 if major region is Western Finland 
  East 1 if major region is Eastern Finland 
  North 1 if major region is Northern Finland 
Sub-region Type of (NUTS 4-level) sub-region 
  Metropolitan area 1 if the sub-region is metropolitan region 
  University 1 if the sub-region is a many-sided university region 
  Regional centre 1 if the sub-region is a regional centre 
  Industrial centre 1 if the sub-region is an industrial centre 
  Rural area 1 if the sub-region is rural 
  Countryside 1 if the sub-region is sparsely populated sub-region 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate in the sub-region (%) 
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A1. Descriptive statistics: public and private sector males 
 
Variable 
Public 
 
Private 
 
 Mean s.t.d Mean s.t.d 
Monthly wage (euros) 2586 920,9 2616 918,5 
Personal characteristics     
Experience 19,01 11,97 19,13 11,71 
Exper sqd./100 5,04 5,14 5,03 5,08 
Tenure 3,17 5,92 9,63 9,40 
Married 0,785 0,411 0,745 0,436 
Child 0,566 0,496 0,544 0,498 
Language     
  Finnish 0,942 0,234 0,938 0,240 
  Swedish 0,046 0,209 0,049 0,216 
  Non-native 0,012 0,110 0,013 0,111 
Education     
  Primary 0,142 0,349 0,209 0,407 
  Secondary 0,356 0,479 0,487 0,500 
  Lowest-level 0,196 0,397 0,149 0,356 
  Lower-level 0,077 0,267 0,090 0,286 
  Highest-level or doctorate 0,229 0,005 0,065 0,246 
Field of education     
  General and other 0,227 0,419 0,269 0,444 
  Teaching 0,015 0,123 0,001 0,037 
  Humanities and art 0,021 0,145 0,008 0,088 
  Trade 0,111 0,314 0,099 0,299 
  Natural sciences 0,026 0,159 0,014 0,116 
  Technology 0,321 0,467 0,538 0,499 
  Agriculture 0,038 0,190 0,028 0,165 
  Medical 0,082 0,274 0,008 0,087 
  Services 0,159 0,367 0,035 0,185 
Occupation     
  Managerial 0,114 0,318 0,046 0,209 
  Professional 0,269 0,444 0,129 0,335 
  Technical 0,202 0,402 0,184 0,388 
  Clerks 0,045 0,207 0,042 0,201 
  Sales & care 0,102 0,303 0,062 0,242 
  Craft 0,093 0,290 0,259 0,438 
  Operative 0,066 0,249 0,208 0,405 
  Others* 0,109 0,311 0,070 0,256 
Industry     
  Manufacturing* 0,001 0,028 0,48 0,500 
 30
  Electricity 0,049 0,215 0,011 0,103 
  Construction 0,058 0,233 0,069 0,254 
  Sales & hotel & restaurant 0,007 0,081 0,167 0,372 
  Transportation 0,048 0,215 0,116 0,320 
  Finance 0,003 0,055 0,014 0,116 
  Real estate & research 0,150 0,357 0,117 0,323 
  Public administration 0,346 0,476 0,000 0,000 
  Education 0,135 0,341 0,003 0,054 
  Health 0,123 0,329 0,004 0,062 
  Other* 0,080 0,271 0,019 0,137 
R&D     
  R&D1 0,032 0,177 0,024 0,153 
  R&D2 0,086 0,280 0,090 0,286 
  R&D3 0,075 0,264 0,080 0,271 
  R&D4 0,208 0,406 0,238 0,426 
  R&D5 0,057 0,233 0,049 0,217 
  R&D6 0,143 0,350 0,143 0,350 
  R&D7 0,070 0,255 0,070 0,256 
  R&D8 0,329 0,470 0,306 0,461 
Regional characteristics     
Province     
  South 0,526 0,499 0,557 0,497 
  West 0,223 0,416 0,255 0,436 
  East 0,130 0,336 0,090 0,286 
  North 0,121 0,327 0,098 0,297 
Sub-region     
  Metropolitan area 0,335 0,472 0,330 0,470 
  University 0,247 0,431 0,222 0,415 
  Regional centre 0,204 0,403 0,204 0,403 
  Industrial centre 0,068 0,252 0,112 0,315 
  Rural area 0,092 0,289 0,107 0,309 
  Countryside 0,054 0,227 0,026 0,159 
Unemployment  12,26 4,690 11,85 4,230 
Number of obs 8 759  33 921  
 
Notes:  others=armed force, agriculture and fishery workers and others;  
manufacturing = mining and manufacturing; other = agriculture, others and not known 
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A2 Descriptive statistics, wages by sectors (males) 
 
Table A1: Observations and wages by industry 
Males Public Private 
  N Wage N Wage 
Private 
premium
Manufacturing 7 2227 16 267 2636 409 
Electricity 425 2644 365 3201 557 
Construction 505 2253 2351 2532 279 
Transportation 425 2815 3935 2432 -383 
Real estate 1316 2463 4009 2884 421 
Education 1180 2729 101 2691 -38 
Health 1083 2688 129 2541 -147 
Rest 3818 2565 6764 2515 50 
Total 8759 2586 33921 2616 30 
 
 
Table A2: Observations and wages by education level 
 
  Public Private 
  N Wage N Wage 
Private 
premium
Primary 1247 2111 7103 2335 224 
Secondary 3118 2167 16513 2383 216 
Lowest-level 1714 2478 5058 2887 409 
Lower-level 678 2941 3052 3252 311 
Highest-level or 
doctorate 2002 3502 2195 3769 267 
Total 8759 2586 33921 2616 30 
 
 
Table A3: Observations and wages by occupation 
 
  Public Private 
  N Wage N Wage 
Private 
premium
Managerial 998 3181 1548 3798 617 
Professional 2359 3175 4371 3417 242 
Technical 1773 2484 6249 2918 434 
Clerks 392 1927 1438 2348 421 
Sales & care 895 2268 2115 2077 -191 
Craft 810 2110 8778 2294 184 
Operative 582 2220 7035 2375 155 
Others 950 1878 2387 2128 250 
Total 8759 2586 33921 2616 30 
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Table A4: Observations and wages by field of education 
 
  Public Private 
  N Wage N Wage 
Private 
premium 
General & other 1991 2547 9132 2423 -124 
Teaching 134 2718 47 2612 -106 
Humanities and art 187 2757 263 2566 -191 
Trade 969 2853 3364 2913 60 
Natural sciences 226 2783 465 3631 848 
Technology 2815 2445 18250 2668 223 
Agriculture 330 2137 945 2412 275 
Medical 714 2874 258 2677 -197 
Services 1393 2624 1197 2230 -394 
Total 8759 2586 33921 2616 30 
 
 
